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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee
vs.

:
:
:
:

JOHNNIE B. MILLSAP
Defendant/Appellant

Case No.
Dist.No.

20050746-CA
041901845

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Appellant is appealing from a Judgment, Sentence and Commitment in the
Second District Court for Weber County, Utah, dated February 4, 2005.

The

Defendant pled guilty to Driving under the influence of alcohol, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of U.C.A. § 41-6-44(2004).

The plea was entered

pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The Defendant was
sentenced to serve one year on this case. It was ordered to run concurrent to a zero to
five sentence he received on a separate case. Jurisdiction for the Appeal is conferred
upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(j).
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

DOES THE DEFENDANT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE
DUI STATUTE?

Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of law and therefore no deference
should be given to the district court's ruling. See, Provo City v. Willden, 768 P.2d
455 456 (Utah 1989)("Because the resolution of this case depends entirely on
questions of law, we accord no deference to the rulings of the . . . district courts . ..")
I.

IS U.C.A. §41-6-44 UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE?

Standard of Review:

This issue presents a question of law which an appellate

court should review for correctness giving no deference to the trial court's legal
conclusions. "Constitutional challenges to statutes present questions of law,
which we review for correctness." State v. Ansari, 100 P.3d 231, 234 (Utah Ct.
App. 2004).
This issue was preserved for appeal when Defendant's attorney filed a motion
to declare the statute unconstitutional. (R. 26-27).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
§ 41-6-44(2004)- In 2001, section 41-6-44(2)(a) read;
A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle
within this state if the personrhas sufficient alcohol in his body that a
chemical test given within two hours of the alleged operation or
physical control shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol
concentration of .08 grams or greater;
Section 41-6-44 was amended in 2002. This section now reads;
(2)(a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a
vehicle within this state if the person:
(i)

has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent
chemical test shows that the person has a blood or breath
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alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time
of the test;
§78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review
of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State
Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of
Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state
engineer;
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was charged by Information with Driving under the influence
with priors, a third degree felony, in violation of U.C.A. §41-6-44. (R. 001). His
attorney filed a motion to declare Utah's DUI statute unconstitutional with an
accompanying memorandum of points and authorities.

(R.

20-27).

The State

objected to Defendant's motion. (R. 28-32). After a hearing and further briefing the
trial court denied Defendant's motion. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an
Order were prepared and signed by the Honorable W. Brent West. (R. 59-61). The
Court ruled that the Defendant did not have standing to challenge the DUI statute,
that the statute does not create a conclusive presumption, and that the statute was not
vague or overbroad. (R. 59-61).
After the denial of his motion, the Defendant entered a into a plea agreement
where he pled guilty to an unrelated third degree felony DUI and the charge in this
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case was reduced to a Class A misdemeanor. (R. 91-92). The plea was entered
pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The Defendant was
sentenced to the Utah State Prison. His sentence on this case was ordered to run
concurrent with his prison sentence. (R. 094-95) The Sentence, Judgment and
Commitment was signed on August 3, 2005. (R. 094-95). A timely notice of appeal
was filed on September 1, 2005. (R. 116).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On March 27, 2004, the Defendant was stopped by a police officer and
eventually cited for DUI in violation of U.C.A. §41-6-44(2004). The Defendant
submitted to an intoxilyzer test and had a blood alcohol content of .099. The test was
performed within one hour of the Defendant's stop.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Section 41-6-44 of the Utah Code is unconstitutionally vague on its face. The
statute prohibits anyone from being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle and
then subsequently having a blood alcohol level in excess of .08. There is nothing in
the statute that requires a nexus between the driving and the subsequent chemical
test. The way the statute is written someone is guilty of a DUI when they are seen
driving a vehicle one day and then the next day they submit to a chemical test that
showed their blood alcohol content was in excess of .08. The statute is so vague that
a person of ordinary intelligence would not know what specific conduct is prohibited.
For these reasons, the statute is vague on its face and the Defendant respectfully
requests this Court to reverse his conviction.
4

ARGUMENT
L

THE DEFENDANT HAS STANDING TO CHALLENGE UTAH'S
DUI STATUTE.

The Defendant is challenging the constitutionality of U.C.A. §41-6-44 on its
face.
The State argued and the trial court ruled that Defendant does not have
standing to challenge Utah's DUI statute. (See, R. 028-32, 59-61). For a defendant
to have standing he must show "some distinct and palpable injury that gives him [or
her] a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute." Provo City v. Willden, 768
P.2d 455 (Utah 1989)(citations omitted). A defendant needs to have more than a
"mere allegation of an adverse impact." State v. Ansari, 100 P.3d 231, 240 (Utah Ct.
App. 2004).
If a defendant doesn't have a personal stake in the controversy, "then the
defendant would still have standing if there were no challenger with a more direct
interest in the issues who can more adequately litigate the issues." Id. (quotations
omitted). In addition, a defendant may have standing "if the court determines that the
issues raised by the [complainant] are of sufficient public importance in and of
themselves to grant . . . standing." Id. (citations and quotations omitted)(alterations
in original).
In the case at bar, the Defendant has standing to challenge U.C.A. §41-6-44
under any of the three theories. First, the Defendant has a personal stake in the
controversy. He was charged with a third degree felony and eventually pled guilty to
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a class A misdemeanor in this case and to a third degree felony in a separate case for
violating the same statute. In the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law
the court ruled that the Defendant didn't have standing because the intoxilyzer test
was performed within an hour of the time the Defendant operated his vehicle. The
Court further found that someone who had a more significant period of time between
operating the vehicle and taking an intoxilyzer test would be in a better position to
challenge the DUI statute. (R. 59-60, Finding of Fact #1).
Even if this Court agrees with the trial court and finds that someone with a
longer time period between the driving and the test would be in a better position to
challenge the statute it should still find that Defendant has standing. That is because
this matter is one of sufficient importance. Standing should be granted when "the
constitutionally protected interests infringed . . . are so important that their protection
need not await the perfect plaintiff." Provo City v. Willden, 768 P.2d at 457.
Furthermore, the Defendant faces the potential of future prosecution and
cannot conform his conduct to the requirements of the law as it is currently written.
If the statute is not found to be unconstitutional this Defendant would be forced to
give up drinking or give up driving. Additionally, this Defendant potentially faces
prosecution for each instance he has driven in the past prior to March 27, 2004 when
the test was administered since the test would be "a subsequent chemical test" that
establishes a breath alcohol level in excess of .08.
Thousands of people are prosecuted each year for violating the State's DUI
statute. In addition, the statute is one that is important for public safety. If the statute
6

is constitutionally flawed it is important that the issue be addressed in a timely
fashion so that the rights and protections for Utah's citizens will not be affected.
II.

U.C.A. §41-6-44 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE.

U.C.A. §41-6-44 is unconstitutionally vague on its face. "[V]agueness
questions are essentially procedural due process issues, i.e., whether the statute
adequately notices the proscribed conduct." State v. Frampton, 131 P.2d 183, 19192 (Utah 1987).

A statute needs to give explicit instructions concerning its

prohibitions. A "statute is not unconstitutionally vague if it is sufficiently explicit to
inform the ordinary reader what conduct is prohibited." State v. Theobald, 645 P.2d
50, 51 (Utah 1982)(footnote omitted).
In 2002, Utah's DUI statute was amended. The amendment deleted specific
language with very vague language that allows the State to prosecute anyone who
both drives a vehicle and consumes alcohol even if the two activities are not
connected.
In 2001, section 41-6-44(2)(a) read;
A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle
within this state if the person:
(i)

has sufficient alcohol in his body that a chemical test
given within two hours of the alleged operation or
physical control shows that the person has a blood or
breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater;

U.C.A. §41-6-44(2)(a)(2001).

Under the old statute the language clearly tied

being in actually physical control of a motor vehicle with the prohibition of having a
blood alcohol concentration of above .08. It required that the test be administered
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within two hours of the driving. This is no longer required. Section 41-6-44 was
amended in 2002. This section now reads;
(2)(a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a
vehicle within this state if the person:
(ii)

has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent
chemical test shows that the person has a blood or breath
alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time
of the test;

U.C.A. §41-6-44(2)(a)(2004).

Under the current statute there is no nexus between

the driving and having a blood alcohol concentration of .08 or greater. A test may be
given one hour, two hours, one day or one week after the individual was in actual
physical control of a vehicle.

Under this statute the person is guilty of DUI

regardless of how much time elapsed between the driving and the intoxication. There
is nothing in this portion of the statute that requires the person to have been under the
influence at the time that he or she was in actual physical control of the motor
vehicle.
The language in this statue is so vague that a person of ordinary intelligence
could not determine the specific conduct that is illegal. "The void-for vagueness
doctrine requires that a statute or ordinance define an offense with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."

Salt

Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1265 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)(quotations and
citations omitted). It's hard to imagine a statue that is more open to arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement than this one. The statute makes it so that anyone who
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consumes alcohol to the point that they reach the level of .08 is prohibited from
operating a vehicle at any time since all that has to be shown is that a person drove a
vehicle and had a blood alcohol concentration of above .08. There is nothing in this
statute that requires a nexus between the driving and being under the influence of
alcohol. Therefore, this statute is subject to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement
towards anyone who consumes alcohol in the State.
CONCLUSION
Section 41-6-44 is unconstitutionally vague on its face. The statute fails to
give adequate notice in sufficiently explicit terms at to what conduct is prohibited.
Under the statute a person could be convicted for DUI when they consumed alcohol a
week or a month after they drove the vehicle. For these reasons, the Defendant
respectfully requests this Court to declare the statute unconstitutional and reverse his
conviction.
DATED this J6_'day of February, 2006.

DEE W. SMITH
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Mark
Shurtleff, Utah Attorney General, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 160 East 300 South, 6th
Floor PO Box 140854 SLC, Utah 84114-0180, postage prepaid this _ day of
February, 2006.

DEE W. SMITH
Attorney at Law
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs

Case No: 041901845 FS

JOHNNIE BORDEN MILLSAP,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

W BRENT WEST
August 3, 2 0 05

PRESENT
Clerk:
pama
Prosecutor: LYON, NATHAN D
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): GALE, GARY L
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: November 12, 1952
Video
Tape Number:
W8-3-05
Tape Count: 10:28

CHARGES
1. DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS (amended) - Class A
Misdemeanor
Plea: No Contest
- Disposition: 06/15/2005 No Contest
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
The one year on this case to run concurrent with the 0-5 years on
case 041907049 and to be served at the Utah State Prison.
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
Court recommends to the Board of Pardons that the defendant be
granted credit for the time he has served and if he is paroled that
he may be compacted to the State of Mississippi.

004

Case No: 041901845
Date:
Aug 03, 2005
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE
OF ALC/DRUGS a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a
term of 1 year(s)

W BRENT WEST
District Court Judge

(MOf"
Paqe 2 (last)

ADDENDUM B

BRANDEN B. MILES, UBN # 9777
oLCOND DiSTRJCT COURT
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD., 2ND FLOOR
2085 FEB 2 2 P M IM
OGDEN, UTAH 84401
TELEPHONE: (801) 399-8377

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER OF THE COURT

STATE OF UTAH.
Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No. 041901845

JOHNNIE BORDEN MILLSAP
DOB: 11/12/1952

Judge W. BRENT WEST

Defendant.

On October 6, 2004, this matter came before the Court for a hearing on Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss and Suppress. Gary Gale, representing Defendant, and Brandon Maynard,
representing the State, were present. After receiving memorandums and hearing oral arguments
from both parties, the Court requested supplemental briefing. The State, now represented by
Branden Miles, filed an additional brief on January 26, 2005. The Court makes the following
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Defendant has no standing to challenge the Driving Under the Influence statute, §
41-6-44, because his factual situation and his concerns about the potentially
significant time difference between operating a vehicle and taking an Intoxilyzer
test is not applicable in his case since the officer tested him within an hour of

operating his vehicle. A person who has a more significant period of time
between the operation of a vehicle and the taking of an Intoxilyzer test would be
better suited to challenge the DUI statute.
2.

The Utah State Legislature has the authority to change the DUI statute and this
Court must pay deference to their decision to change how the prosecution may
prove a DUI in Utah.

3.

The Legislature intended the change in the DUI statute, which now allows a
person who registers a .08 or greater at the time of the test to be charged, to punish
the person who drinks alcohol and then tries to drive home before his or her
breath alcohol level rises above a .08.

4.

The DUI statute does not create a conclusive or irrefutable presumption that a
person who takes an Intoxilyzer with a result .08 or higher and has operated a
vehicle at some time in the significant past is guilty of DUI.

5.

At trial, the State has the burden to prove a nexus between the operation of a
motor vehicle and the taking of an Intoxilyzer test.

6.

The State's burden to prove the connection between taking an Intoxilyzer test and
operating a motor vehicle never shifts to the Defendant.

7.

Though the burden does not shift, a defendant may challenge the nexus between
the operation of a vehicle and the taking of an Intoxilyzer test.

8.

The DUI Statute is not vague or overly broad because reasonable people can
identify what behavior the statute prohibits.
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CONCLUSION OF LAW
1.

The Defendant does not have standing to challenge the DUI statute. UTAH CODE
ANN. § 41-6-44 (2004). The DUI Statute does not create a conclusive
presumption, nor is it vague or overbroad.
ORDER

The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Suppress is Denied.
DATED this J l _ day of

fiE£gU*M

, 2005.

fa. S&ft^

W. BRENT WEST
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Prepared by:

BrandenB. Miles
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Gary Gale

061

